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MEASURING SECURITIES MARKET
EFFICIENCY IN THE REGULATORY
SETTING
RANDALL S. THOMAS* AND JAMES F. COTTER**
I
INTRODUCTION
In November 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) pro-
posed a modification to the federal securities law disclosure requirements to fa-
cilitate the process of issuing new securities.  In a massive document, nicknamed
the Aircraft Carrier,1 the SEC sought public comments on a variety of proposed
changes to the federal securities laws that were designed to minimize the cost
and delays associated with issuing securities, while continuing to provide the
public with the information that it needed to make investment decisions.  Al-
though the public comment period on these proposals has passed without any
apparent action by the SEC, the policy questions raised by the Aircraft Carrier
continue to be important ones.
This article addresses one of the key issues that the Aircraft Carrier raised:
How can we determine when companies should be able to issue simplified dis-
closure documents?  In this proposed regulatory regime, the SEC suggested the
use of a simplified registration statement, Form B, for larger, more experienced
issuers, while other companies would continue to make traditional extensive
disclosures using Form A whenever they sell securities to the public.2  The
SEC’s proposal would have limited Form B disclosure to firms who had a public
float greater than $250 million, or had a combination of $75 million in public
float and average daily trading volume (“ADTV”) greater than $1 million.3
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1. Securities Act Release No. 7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Aircraft
Carrier].
2. See id. at 58-60.
3. Public float is the aggregate market value (price times number of shares) of the issuer’s out-
standing voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates of the issuer.  See id. at 58 n.78.
While similar to market capitalization (price times shares outstanding), float excludes shares owned by
affiliates of the company that are not readily available for investment by institutional or small investors.
For calculating ADTV for purposes of Form B, “issuers would be required to measure their ADTV
during the three full calendar months (or any 90 consecutive calendar days ending within 10 calendar
days) immediately preceding the filing of the registration statement.”  Id. at 59.
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Similar to the way that the short form and shelf registration systems intro-
duced by the SEC in the early 1980s allowed companies to take their securities
to market more efficiently and quickly, the proposed Form B disclosure rules
were intended to decrease the amount of time and to lower the cost associated
with selling a company’s securities.  The theoretical basis for permitting simpli-
fied disclosure for some companies, but not for others, rests on the efficient
capital markets hypothesis.  This theory postulates that the market for a com-
pany’s securities can be said to be efficient if, for a specific set of information,
the security’s market price is the same as it would be if all investors possessed
this information.4  Securities that trade in efficient markets have rapid price
adjustments to new information, whereas those in inefficient markets do not.
Today, it is well accepted that the efficient capital markets hypothesis consti-
tutes the theoretical underpinning for the federal securities laws disclosure pol-
icy.5
The SEC’s premise in the Aircraft Carrier proposals was that companies
whose shares are traded in an efficient capital market should be permitted to
file simplified registration statements that incorporate by reference many of
their other federal securities law filings.6  While we agree with this fundamental
premise, we believe that the regulatory criteria that the SEC proposed for issu-
ers to be eligible to file on the new Form B failed to capture market efficiency
adequately.  In this article, we argue that the SEC’s study of the underlying fac-
tors that lead to capital market efficiency—which uses analyst following for a
company’s stock as a proxy for market efficiency—employed too broad a defi-
nition of what constitutes an “analyst” for purposes of measuring market effi-
ciency.  We also believe that the SEC failed to consider other important avail-
able proxies for market efficiency, particularly the level of institutional
investors’ stock ownership in these companies.
When we adjust the definition of analyst to reflect more accurately only
those analysts whose research effectively disseminates information to investors
in the market, we find that the proposed numerical cutoffs for the use of Form
B were set much too low.  This conclusion is confirmed when we examine the
4. Financial economists and legal scholars use different measures or methods to judge the effi-
ciency of financial markets.  See Eugene F. Fama II, Efficient Capital Markets, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991).
Financial economists are generally more focused on the financial ramifications of the disclosed infor-
mation, and as such focus on the speed at which security markets incorporate information into the
value of a security.  Therefore, an efficient market would be one that quickly incorporates a value-
relevant information release (for example, the announcement of a takeover where the target firm is
being acquired at a significant premium over the pre-takeover price).  If information is incorporated
slowly, some investors who have not incorporated the revelation of a takeover, for instance, would be
adversely affected in favor of others who have.  Legal scholars, on the other hand, focus on the magni-
tude of the response, and view an efficient market as one that correctly values information so that secu-
rity prices do not over- or under-shoot the correct price.  In this instance, legal scholars view an effi-
cient market as one that correctly incorporates the information on security prices.  In this article, we
focus on the legal or informational efficiency that would be measured by the extent to which informa-
tion is communicated to the relevant investment community by sell-side security analysts.
5. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 550 (1984).
6. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 38, 39 .
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distribution of institutional investor stock ownership in American companies,
and reach the same result.
If the SEC should decide to implement the proposed changes, we suggest
that it raise its proposed numerical thresholds for the use of Form B.  While we
do not offer a specific set of new thresholds, we urge the SEC to adopt our
methodology and revise their earlier research to determine new thresholds for
the use of Form B. We believe that it is imperative that investors receive full
and complete disclosures whenever the underlying capital markets cannot be
relied upon to disseminate information swiftly and fully about the company.
This may not occur if the proposed criteria for the use of Form B are adopted.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.  Section II begins by
briefly examining the SEC’s methodology in determining market efficiency in
the adoption of the short form registration system.  It then outlines the SEC’s
Aircraft Carrier proposals for Forms A and B, and concludes with a discussion
of the existing scholarship on measuring market efficiency using quantitative
indicators.  Section III looks at the underlying research conducted by the SEC’s
staff prior to the issuance of the Aircraft Carrier.  In section IV, we discuss our
research methodology and data.  We finish with some brief concluding observa-
tions.
II
THE SEC’S USE OF MARKET EFFICIENCY IN REGULATING SECURITIES
OFFERINGS
A. The Integrated Disclosure System and Form S-3
The integrated disclosure system adopted by the SEC was designed to meet
investors’ need for information about the companies selling securities, while si-
multaneously eliminating the previous overlap of information disclosure and
dissemination requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act
of 1934.7  The new system had two essential pieces: first, uniform disclosure re-
quirements for all documents filed under the two acts; and second—and more
important for our purposes—the coordination of the disclosure required by
these acts to permit the incorporation by reference of company-specific infor-
mation from Exchange Act filings into Securities Act filings.8
Three new forms were introduced for the registration of securities:  (1)
Form S-1, which requires complete disclosure to be set forth in the prospectus
without any incorporation by reference;9 (2) Form S-2, which allows incorpora-
tion by reference from the company’s Exchange Act filings, but requires the is-
suer to forward either its last annual report or Form 10-K as part of the final
7. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, [1937-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,328, at 62,992 (Mar. 3, 1982).
8. See id. ¶ 72,328, at 62,993.
9. See id. ¶ 72,328, at 62,994.
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prospectus;10 and (3) Form S-3, which presents the same transaction specific in-
formation as Forms S-1 and S-2, and allows incorporation by reference from the
issuer’s Exchange Act reports, but requires a final prospectus of only the con-
firmation slip conveying price-related information.11 Form S-3 is the preferred
alternative for most issuers.  Companies that want to issue securities quickly
benefit because an S-3 registration statement can be prepared and become ef-
fective in just a few days, instead of a few weeks or months when more lengthy
documents are filed.  The costs of preparing Form S-3 are also lower than those
associated with Form S-1.
At the time of the adoption of these new forms, the SEC created two gen-
eral types of eligibility requirements for Form S-3.12  First, a U.S. issuer needed
to have thirty-six months of experience reporting under the Exchange Act.13
Second, if the registrant satisfied the first criteria, it needed also to have a
minimum $150 million float, or a $100 million float and annual trading volume
of at least three million shares.14  Float was used as an eligibility standard for
several reasons: (1) because it was a widely used eligibility criterion among
trading market organizations that seek to measure the breadth of market fol-
lowing in listing and delisting situations; (2) because the Federal Reserve Board
uses float as a criterion to delineate over-the-counter issues that may be traded
on margin; and (3) because commentators on the proposal supported its contin-
ued use; and (4) because investment institutions revealed that float is a promi-
nent, numerically-defined standard in making research coverage decisions.15
Trading volume was also considered as an eligibility standard because it affects
information dissemination to the market, and was an important criterion for in-
vestment analysts in deciding which stocks to follow.16
Form S-3 was designed in reliance on the efficient capital market hypothesis
and its numerical thresholds were intended to be a rough proxy for companies
widely followed by the investment community.17 Commentators quickly pointed
out that Form S-3 covered many companies that were not extensively covered
10. See id. ¶ 72,328, at 62,994-95.
11. See id. ¶ 72,328, at 62,995.
12. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 614-15 (1989).
13. See id. at 616.  There are also some requirements that the issuer has not defaulted on a variety
of financial matters.  See id.
14. See id. at 615-16.  Float, or aggregate market value, was calculated using either “the price at
which the stock was last sold or the average of bid and asked prices of the stock on any date within 60
days before the date of filing” of the registration statement.  Id. at 617 n.47.  Annual trading volume
was the “volume of shares traded in any continuous 12-month period ending within 60 days before the
filing.” Id.
15. See Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 6331, Exchange Act Release No. 18,007, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,904 (Aug.
18, 1981) [hereinafter Reproposing Release].
16. See id. at 41,904-05.  In the end, trading volume was adopted only when concurrently present
with a minimum level of float because of concerns that it would lead to uncertainty over which issuers
could file a Form S-3 and that it might discriminate against issuers whose stock was held by long-term
investors.  See id.
17. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 876 (1992).
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by analysts.18  At the time the integrated disclosure system was adopted, the
SEC estimated that the dual eligibility standards would result in roughly 32% of
the NYSE-, AMEX-, and NASDAQ-listed companies, or 17.6% of all reporting
companies, being eligible to file Form S-3.19  In 1992, the SEC relaxed these cri-
teria so that the minimum issuer reporting requirements were dropped from
thirty-six months to twelve months, and the float requirement was reduced to a
minimum of $75 million in voting stock held by non-affiliates.20
Integrated disclosure was based on the idea that where securities markets
were efficient, there was no need for companies to disclose information in the
registration statement that was already publicly available.21  The SEC, however:
never attempted directly to study which securities were traded in an efficient market,
and could be issued safely with firm specific data incorporated by reference.  Instead,
the agency focused on one mechanism of market efficiency—ongoing monitoring by
institutional investors and securities analysts—and defined a category of securities that
it was confident would be “actively and widely followed.”  This did not mean that
other securities also would not be traded in an efficient market.  Other mechanisms of
market efficiency such as the financial press or the computerized dissemination of firm
specific data might create an efficient market in these securities as well. But the
Commission proceeded cautiously, assuming only an operative and efficient market
for a class of securities when it was able to assemble circumstantial evidence to sup-
port the assumption.22
This practical definition of market efficiency, focusing on coverage of a security
by institutional investors and securities analysts, continues to be employed by
the SEC in its latest proposals to reform the securities laws.23
18. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Se-
curities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 813 (1985).
19. See Reproposing Release, supra note 15, at 41,910.
20. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 115 (1996 Supp.) (noting that
the trading volume alternative requirement was dropped entirely).
21. The SEC stated its belief that “the market operates efficiently for [S-3] companies, i.e. that the
disclosure in Exchange Act reports and other communications by the registrant, such as press releases,
has already been disseminated and accounted for by the marketplace.”  Langevoort, supra note 17, at
876 (quoting Reproposing Release, supra note 15, at 41,904).  Gordon and Kornhauser argue that:
[f]or the SEC, the efficient market hypothesis justifies its Form S-3 policy as follows.  Information
contained in 1934 Act disclosures is widely disseminated through the financial press, is publicly
available for free or at nominal cost, for at least a certain set of issuers, is closely studied by finan-
cial analysts and other sophisticated market participants.  Therefore, such public information
should be reflected in the price of the issuer’s securities.
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 811-12.
22. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 616.  The $150 million float was determined to cause a
sufficiently high level of security analysis to ensure extensive, ongoing monitoring and evaluation of
companies.  See id. at 615 n.41.  But see Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 812-13; JAMES D. COX
ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 247 (2d ed. 1997) (citing Reproposing
Release, supra note 15, at 41,909 (reporting that larger investment institutions tended to focus their
analytical efforts on 300-500 issuers at any one time)).
23. The SEC is doing today exactly what commentators noted that it did when it adopted the inte-
grated disclosure system.  See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 812:
Rather than condition eligibility on a determination of the efficiency of a particular market (such as
the New York Stock Exchange), the SEC tried to identify those particular securities likely to be ef-
ficiently priced.  The SEC acted on the theory that market efficiency results from the competitive
research and trading activities of market participants.  The SEC chose to use major investment in-
stitutions, such as large broker-dealers, as a proxy for market participants.
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B. The Aircraft Carrier Proposals and Form B
In November 1998, the SEC launched the Aircraft Carrier proposals in an
effort to reform the registration system for securities.  These proposals were
based on the premise that the traditional mandated disclosure system might not
be necessary any longer to ensure that public investors have sufficient informa-
tion to make sound investment decisions when issuers that have an established
market following sell securities.24  Instead:
[f]or larger seasoned issuers, communications made around the time of a typical regis-
tered offering, whether or not part of a traditional prospectus, provide the basis for in-
vestment decisions in the offering.  Those issuers are well followed by the market and
the important statements that they make are quickly disseminated and considered by
investors. . . .25
The SEC proposed that these larger, well-established issuers be able to issue se-
curities using a simplified registration statement, named “Form B.”26  Most
other issuers would use Form A, which employs the traditional full-disclosure
format.27
Form B, according to the SEC, would “provide much the same flexibility to
issuers that delayed shelf registration on Forms S-3 and F-3 has provided,” but
would also have many advantages.28   For companies using Form B, the existing
prospectus disclosure system would no longer be needed.  Rather, their pro-
spectuses would include only offering information, the issuer’s 1934 Act reports
via incorporation by reference, a securities term sheet, an undertaking to pro-
vide incorporated information to investors on request, and, in the case of non-
U.S. issuers, the U.S. GAAP reconciliation.29  The registration statement would
not need to be filed with the SEC prior to the offering of the securities, al-
though it would need to be filed before sales could begin.  Free writing and
communications would be permitted at any time for Form B issuers, and those
free writing materials used during the offering period, beginning fifteen days
prior to the first offer, would need to be filed with the SEC at the time that the
registration statement is filed.30  Furthermore, the underwriters and issuers
would designate the effective date of the registration statement and have com-
plete control over when they offer and sell securities under Form B.31 Some of
the other advantages that Form B offers over the current shelf registration sys-
tem include no front-end-loaded registration fee, and no concerns about over-
hang of securities on the market for the company’s stock.32
24. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 49.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 55-56 (discussing the various ways in which Form B would be
preferable over Forms S-3 and F-3).
29. See Mark S. Bergman, United States, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1999, at 24 (Supp. Capital Mar-
kets Yearbook 1999).
30. See Bergman, supra note 29, at 4.
31. See id.
32. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 56.
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To qualify to use Form B, a company with at least twelve months of report-
ing history under the Exchange Act must either have “a public float of $75 mil-
lion or more and an [average daily trading volume] (ADTV) of $1 million or
more, or [have] a public float of $250 million or more.”33  The SEC looked at the
number of research analysts that would cover companies at various public float
and ADTV levels in order to determine the appropriate thresholds for the use
of Form B.34 The SEC believed that “the number of analysts that cover compa-
nies that fit a certain profile is indicative of the level of investor interest in com-
panies within the profile.”35  This is the same assumption that the SEC made
when it adopted the integrated disclosure system.36
C. Analyst Coverage as a Method of Measuring the Efficiency of Securities
Markets
Analyst coverage is the most widely-accepted method of measuring when
securities markets are efficient at processing information.  Academic commen-
tators have agreed that analyst coverage is an important mechanism for dis-
seminating information to the market.37  For example, Professor Coffee has
claimed that analyst coverage is one of the key means for information to get out
to the investing public.38  Coffee states that “the analyst seems likely to become
the critical mechanism of market efficiency because on-line computerization of
the SEC-filed data makes access to such information both immediate and rela-
tively costless to the analyst.”39
Several empirical studies examine the equity analyst’s role as an information
producer and conduit for company information.  For instance, Sok Te Kim, Je-
33. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
34. See infra text accompanying note 51.
35. Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 59.
36. See Langevoort,  supra note 17, at 876.
37. See, e.g., Alan K. Austin & Clay B. Simpson, Interacting With Analysts, in THE ART OF
COUNSELING DIRECTORS, OFFICERS & INSIDERS 1998, at 91 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 1083, 1998) (stating that “[a]nalyst coverage makes the market for the company’s
stock more efficient, by getting new information out to the public as it is released by the public”); Brad
M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common Stock Efficiency, 19
IOWA J. CORP. L. 285 (1994).
38. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723-24 (1984) (stating that “most accounts explaining the stock market’s
efficiency assign a substantial responsibility to the competition among analysts for securities informa-
tion”).
39. Id. at 723.  According to Coffee, though, there are factors that constrain the analyst’s ability to
perform his function as effectively as possible.  For example, because many people use securities re-
search as the information gets passed along, it has a “public goods-like character.”  Id. at 726.  This
character, in turn, means that the analyst will not get the full economic benefit of his work and will,
therefore, engage in less search and verification than the investing public desires.  See id.  Another
problem that the analyst faces is the fact that he cannot contract on a bilateral basis and is, therefore,
under-compensated, a fact that also operates as a disincentive.  See id. at 727.  Coffee argues that man-
datory disclosure will alleviate these problems and allow analysts to perform their market function.  See
id. at 728.  He states that mandated disclosure “reduces the market professional’s marginal cost of ac-
quiring and verifying information” and “increases the aggregate amount of securities research and veri-
fication provided.”  Id. at 729.  As analysts begin to see more returns on their work, there will be an in-
flux of competitors into the field and the industry will therefore become more competitive.  See id.
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Chai Lin, and Myron Slovin examine the market response to analysts who initi-
ate coverage on a company with a buy recommendation.40  They find that de-
spite slight differences between NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ announcements,
the private information disseminated by analysts who initiate coverage with a
buy recommendation is reflected in stock prices in less than fifteen minutes.41
Similarly, Carl Chen, James Wuh Lin, and David Sauer examine the “in-
formational effect of earnings announcements on stock price changes,” and how
the number of analysts affect the extent of an earnings surprise and the lag for
the information to be reflected in stock prices.42  They show that the number of
analysts significantly decreases the extent to which the market is “surprised” by
the company’s announced earnings (percent difference between the analysts’
consensus estimate and the actual reported earnings).43  Moreover, they show
that the market adjusts more quickly to information releases as the number of
analysts increases.44
These studies do not, however, resolve the critical question of what level of
analyst coverage is necessary to ensure that securities markets are efficient.  As
commentators on the earlier adoption of integrated disclosure noted, even if
one accepts the claim that market efficiency justifies the use of simplified dis-
closure for the sale of securities of companies whose stock is traded in efficient
markets, a question remains about where to draw the line for making this de-
termination.45  In the next section, we look at the SEC’s research and analysis on
determining the threshold for a company’s qualification to use Form B.
III
THE SEC’S PROPOSAL AND RESEARCH
In its research on the appropriate thresholds for the Form B registration
statement in the Aircraft Carrier, the SEC used the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (“CRSP”) for transaction volume data and Nelson Publications’
data for analyst coverage for the year 1996.46  The Nelson Publications’ data
sweeps analysts of all types into its analyst coverage data, including analysts
that are paid by the companies that they follow.47  We have been informed that
the SEC used an earlier version of this same data in its research at the time of
the adoption of the shelf registration system.48
40. See Sok Te Kim et al., Market Structure, Informed Trading and Analysts’ Recommendations, 32
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 507, 513 (1997).
41. See id.
42. Carl R. Chen et al., Earnings Announcements, Quality and Quantity of Information, and Stock
Price Changes, 20 J. FIN. RES. 483, 492 (1997).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 813.
46. Telephone Interview with SEC staff (Apr. 9, 1999).
47. These paid analysts include Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poors (“S&P”).
48. Telephone Interview with the SEC staff (Apr. 9, 1999).
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The SEC’s research is discussed in several footnotes in Appendix A of the
Aircraft Carrier.49  Their empirical work focused on the level of analyst follow-
ing of a company’s stock as its measure of market efficiency.  The SEC states
that it looked at this factor because it believed that “the analyst coverage is in-
dicative of the level of investor interest in companies.”50  In the footnotes to the
paragraph containing this statement, the SEC indicates that analyst following is
an important measure of market efficiency and that adequate analyst coverage
must exist to ensure an efficient market.51
The footnotes reveal that, using the numerical cutoffs proposed in the Air-
craft Carrier, the SEC found only 4% of companies with ADTV greater than
$1.0 million to have fewer than three analysts following the company.52  Further,
the SEC reports that only 14% of companies with market capitalization of $75
million or more, and 5% of companies with market capitalization of $250 mil-
lion or more, have fewer than three analysts following the company.53  The SEC
also states that its research indicates that companies that meet the proposed
combined public float/ADTV test for Form B eligibility would have an average
of fourteen analysts following them.54
The implication of the SEC’s findings is that the proposed cutoffs will be
sufficient to determine which companies have a demonstrated market following
sufficient to permit them to use Form B.  Investors in these companies are pre-
sumed to have access to multiple sources of information about the company,
thereby making short form registration appropriate.
IV
OUR RESEARCH
A. Methodology
We agree with the SEC that effective communication of information from
companies to investors is made by analysts who communicate to investors.  We
believe, however, that the definition of analyst should have been restricted to
so-called sell-side equity analysts, those individuals who are employed by secu-
rities firms, such as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Merrill Lynch, and others.
These sell-side analysts publish company-specific research and earnings esti-
49. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 58, 60 n.80, 81, 87-91.
50. Id. at 59.
51. The supporting statement is slightly unclear about the SEC’s views on what drives market effi-
ciency.  Footnote 82 of the Aircraft Carrier states that “[w]here an issuer has significant analyst fol-
lowing and the market operates efficiently with respect to price discovery, we believe it is fair to assume
some level of investor awareness of company information.”  Id. at 59 n.82.  We assume that the SEC is
drawing a connection between market efficiency and analyst following similar to the one that we dis-
cuss in the text.  If this is incorrect, we are unclear what mechanisms for price discovery the SEC be-
lieves are operating to make the market efficient.
52. See id. at 58, n.80.
53. See id. at 58, nn.80, 81.
54. See id. at 58.
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mates of a relatively small number of companies.  Their reports are distributed
to the portfolio managers who actually invest in the stock of publicly traded
companies, the buy-side investors.  Sell-side analysts are not explicitly paid by
buy-side investors for their research; rather, their value to their firms arises
from compensated transaction volume being diverted to the sell-side analyst’s
firm.55  We are not aware of any instance where companies followed by sell-side
analysts pay those analysts for publishing research and earnings estimates.56
Therefore, we use only the sell-side equity analysts from major and regional in-
vestment banks that publish research and earnings estimates on the companies
that they follow.57  We believe that these analysts are the most impartial and ac-
curate source of information concerning such companies, and provide a valu-
able conduit for information to pass from companies to investors.
While we include sell-side equity analysts who follow companies with pub-
licly traded equity in our sample, we exclude analysts arising from debt issuance
(major debt rating agencies) that are paid by the companies that they follow to
provide debt ratings when debt securities are issued.  This means that our data
set excludes analysts from such firms as Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard and
Poors (“S&P”).  We exclude these types of analysts, which are included by the
SEC in its research, because they generally do not publish future earnings esti-
mates and their research is not included by major earnings consensus firms
(Zacks and First Call) who distribute this information about future company
earnings results and the future target price for the stock.58
First Call’s earnings estimate dissemination service is a very important con-
duit for information from companies to their investors.  Investors believe that
First Call data is so important that they (investors) actually purchase consensus
earnings estimates and short analyst write-ups (First Call Notes) that sell-side
analysts publish.  We argue that the importance of an analyst could be meas-
ured by the fact that major buy-side firms must purchase First Call’s earnings
estimate data and written comments (First Call Notes) from sell-side analysts.
We believe that analysts included in First Call information represent the most
55. The SEC notes that:
“sell-side” analysts, have inherent conflicts of interest . . .[and] [t]here is a risk that impartial-
ity may be compromised when their firms seek to participate in the issuers’ distribution.  We
believe, nevertheless, that analysts in general, and the expanding “buy-side” analysts in par-
ticular, are in a unique position to gather and analyze information about issuers.  They repre-
sent an undeniably significant method of corporate disclosure and dissemination.
The Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 39 n.6.
56. We note anecdotal evidence that some analysts have attempted to get firms to pay them for
providing analyst coverage of the company’s stock.  See Charles Gasparino, Hired Help: Starved for
Attention, Small Companies “Buy” Wall Street Coverage, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1999, at A1.
57. While we believe that it would be useful to also include “buy-side” analysts, individuals who
are employed by firms (such as pension funds and insurance companies) that invest in the stocks and
bonds of publicly traded companies, we do not know of any public source that discloses which compa-
nies these analysts follow.  We were informed by the SEC that it did not have access to this information
either.
58. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down
for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999) (criticizing accuracy of credit agency rat-
ings).
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reasonable estimate of analyst following by independent conduits of informa-
tion from companies to the institutional investing community.
The SEC’s definition of analyst includes Moody’s, Fitch, and S&P.59  We
note that using the SEC’s definition of analyst will generally guarantee that at
least two analysts will be counted as following any company that has issued debt
or equity securities of any kind in the recent past.  Given that the SEC uses
fewer than three analysts as its threshold for insuring an efficient capital mar-
ket, it is not surprising that the SEC concludes that almost all companies’ stocks
are traded in efficient markets.  If both paid and unpaid analysts are to be in-
cluded in the measure of analyst coverage, we suggest that the SEC’s measure-
ment standard be increased from fewer than three to fewer than five.  We fur-
ther suggest that the SEC recalculate its numerical threshold cutoffs using a
fewer than five measure for analyst following.
B. Description of Data
We sought to replicate the SEC’s results on analyst coverage of proposed
Form B companies using an independent source of data from a financial infor-
mation firm called Market Guide.  Market Guide collects and distributes tradi-
tional financial information, as well as data on analyst coverage and market-
trading information on about 9100 publicly traded firms.  We eliminated firms
whose stock price on December 31, 1998, is less than one dollar per share.  Our
final data set includes approximately 7875 firms.60  The SEC has confirmed that
while its study used data that are somewhat older than ours (1996 data), their
sample was similar in size to ours.61
Using Market Guide, we collected information on the value of each com-
pany’s common equity (market capitalization), the value of the company’s pub-
lic float, the institutional ownership of each company, and the number of equity
analysts that follow each company.  Market Guide uses the well-known analyst
consensus firm, First Call, for consensus estimates of future earnings.  In addi-
tion to consensus earnings estimates, First Call provides Market Guide with the
number of analysts that provide earnings estimates to the market.  First Call
collects analyst following data using approximately 250 firms worldwide and 118
domestic firms that provide equity research to their institutional clients.  Where
no research is published, Market Guide records a zero for the number of ana-
lysts following a company.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our full sample.62  For the sample
as a whole, the average market capitalization was $2.128 billion, while the me-
dian market capitalization was $128 million.  The wide difference between the
59. See supra text accompanying note 47.
60. We deleted firms that have a share price lower than one dollar (so-called “penny stocks”) be-
cause such firms are small, often financially distressed, firms with limited investor interest and virtually
no analyst coverage.  These firms are unlikely to qualify for Form B usage.
61. Telephone Interview with SEC staff (Apr. 9, 1999).
62. The full sample covers all firms whose stock price was greater than one dollar on December 31,
1998.
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mean and median is due to the presence of several large firms in the sample.
The average market capitalization was $5.556 billion (median $819.5 million)
for the NYSE sample and $0.665 billion (median $65.0 million) for the non-
NYSE sample.  As expected, the NYSE had firms larger as measured by market
capitalization.  The average public float was $1.696 billion for the full sample,
with the average of $4.537 billion for the NYSE samples and $475.4 million for
the non-NYSE samples.
TABLE 1
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Full
Sample
NYSE
Sample
Non-NYSE
Sample
Number of firms in sample 7875 2366 5509
Average Market Capitalization (median) B (in mil-
lions)
$2128.1
($128.4)
$5556.0
($819.5)
$655.8
($65.0)
Average Public Float (median) B (in millions) $1696.0
($68.6)
$4537.9
($490.3)
$475.4
($33.4)
Number of firms (percentage) with analyst coverage 4784
(60.7%)
1884
(79.6%)
2900
(52.6%)
Number of Sell-Side Analysts 3.45
(1.00)
6.45
(5.00)
2.15
(1.00)
Percentage of firm owned by institutional investors 34.80% 51.80% 23.15%
Number of firms with Market Capitalization (num-
ber of shares outstanding times stock price) greater
than $250 million
3055
(38.8%)
1823
(77.0%)
1232
(22.4%)
Number of firms with Market Capitalization (num-
ber of shares outstanding times stock price) greater
than $75 million and an Average Daily Trading
Volume (ADTV) greater than $1 million
3413
(43.3%)
1864
(78.7%)
1541
(27.9%)
Number of firms with Market Capitalization (num-
ber of shares outstanding times stock price) greater
than $75 million
4792
(60.8%)
2222
(93.9%)
2570
(46.6%)
Number of firms with Average Daily Trading Vol-
ume (ADTV) greater than $1 million
2744
(34.8%)
1453
(61.4%)
1291
(23.4%)
Source: Market Guide (Dec. 31, 1998).  The following statistical measures were used: aver-
age, median, sum, and percent.
Analysts follow companies where they expect that institutional investors are
going to need investment advice and then act on that advice and purchase stock
through the analyst’s firm.  Table 1 also presents data on the size, analyst fol-
lowing, and institutional ownership for the sample and the sample divided into
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NYSE and non-NYSE sub-samples.  Of the 7875 firms included in our sample,
4784 (60.7%) had published earnings estimates and at least one equity analyst
following the company.  Of those 4784 stocks, 1884 NYSE stocks (79.6% of the
stocks traded on the NYSE) and 2900 non-NYSE stocks (52.6% of the non-
NYSE stocks) had at least one analyst covering each company.
Analysts tend to follow firms where institutional ownership is significant.
As Table 1 indicates, institutions owned approximately 34.8% of firms in the
full sample.  For the NYSE stocks, however, institutions owned 51.8% of each
firm and 23.15% of the non-NYSE stocks.  This suggests that firms with a larger
market capitalization tend to have larger institutional ownership and tend to be
listed on the New York Stock Exchange with a greater analyst following.
As shown in Table 1, if we apply the first of the SEC’s proposed numerical
cutoffs to our sample, 3055 (38.8%) of the firms would qualify to use Form B on
the basis that their market capitalization is in excess of $250 million.63  Firms can
also use Form B if their market capitalization is greater than $75 million and
their ADTV is greater than $1.0 million.  Using this proposed second criterion,
358 (4.5%) additional firms qualified for Form B disclosures.  Thus, using our
data set, we find that a total 3413, or 43.3% of firms in the sample qualify to file
Form B.
We also calculate the number of firms who have market capitalization
greater than $75 million and separately calculate the number of firms that have
ADTV greater than $1.0 million.  We find that 4792 (60.8%) of the sample have
market capitalization greater than $75 million, while 2744 (34.8%) of the sam-
ple have ADTV greater than $1.0 million.64  We note that 1379 firms that would
have qualified to use Form S-3 under the existing numerical thresholds will be
required to use Form A.65
In Table 2, we present our results concerning the extent of analyst following
for companies qualifying to use Form B using each of the proposed criteria to
replicate exactly the footnotes presented by the SEC in the Aircraft Carrier.66
First, we examine firms that have market capitalization greater than $250 mil-
lion.  We find that 797 (26.1%) have fewer than three analysts covering the
firm.
63. While the SEC regulations specify public float as its criteria for Form B qualification, the SEC
uses market capitalization (shares outstanding times stock price) in its published research.  In this arti-
cle, we calculate firms that qualify for Form B disclosures as firms whose market capitalization is
greater than $250 million.
64. We will use these results later to calculate the proportion of firms who have an analyst follow-
ing of “fewer than three.”
65. Using its data, the SEC calculated that 1175 firms that currently report using Form S-3 will be
required to use Form A.  See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 59.  While companies and their represen-
tatives have argued against including current S-3 reporting firms in new Form A disclosures, we believe
that past S-3 reporting should not be the primary method for Form B qualification.  Rather, we argue
that informational efficiency and investor safety and soundness should represent the primary goal of
firm disclosure.  Firms must report what is necessary, unencumbered by the prior regulatory reporting
regime.
66. See Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 58, nn.80, 81.
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Next, we turn to firms that have market capitalization greater than $75 mil-
lion.  We find that 1837 (38.3%) have fewer than three analysts covering the
firm.  Finally, in Table 2 we replicate the SEC’s footnote 80 of the Aircraft Car-
rier and determine that 563 (20.5%) of firms that have ADTV greater than $1
million have fewer than three analysts following the company.
As Table 2 indicates, the SEC claims that the vast majority of firms that
would qualify to use Form B because they have adequate analyst following ap-
pear significantly overstated when our data are used.  For instance, if we com-
pare our calculations of the percentage of firms that have market capitalization
greater than $250 million and fewer than three analysts covering their stock
(26.1%) with the percentage reported by the SEC (4%), the difference is clearly
substantial.  Similar differences appear when other measures of market size are
examined.  These results suggest that the extent of analyst following is signifi-
cantly lower than that estimated by the SEC and that the extent of communica-
tion from company to investor is much lower than assumed by the SEC.
TABLE 2
ANALYST FOLLOWING
SEC
Footnote
Full
Sample
NYSE
Sample
Non-
NYSE
lFrom the given universe of stocks that
have a Market Capitalization (number of
shares outstanding times stock price)
greater than $250 million, how many
(what percentage) of the companies have
fewer than three analysts following
???
(5.0%)
797
(26.1%)
436
(18.4%)
361
(29.3%)
From the given universe of stocks that
have a Market Capitalization (number of
shares outstanding times stock price)
greater than $75 million, how many
(what percentage) of the companies have
fewer than three analysts following
???
(14.0%)
1837
(38.3%)
651
(29.3%)
1186
(46.1%)
From the given universe of stocks that
have more than $1 million in Average
Daily Trading Volume (ADTV) > $1
million, how many (what percentage)
have less than three analysts following
???
(4.0%)
563
(20.5%)
217
(14.9%)
346
(26.8%)
Sources: The Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 58 n.80; Market Guide (Dec. 31, 1998).  The
following statistical measures were used: average, median, sum, and percent.
The difference between our results and those of the SEC is striking.  We
believe that this difference is primarily due to the difference between our defi-
nition of analyst (sell-side analysts) and the SEC’s definition of analyst (all
analysts, paid and unpaid).  We believe that analysts that are not paid by the
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company (sell-side analysts) represent a better measure of analyst following.
As a company issues debt, its securities are customarily rated by S&P, Moody’s,
or Fitch at the behest of the company.  These services are paid by the company
for their ratings.  Sell-side analysts, on the other hand, are loyal to the institu-
tional community and are responsible for communicating information to the
buy-side investors.  If the SEC decides to include both forms of analyst, the
measure of adequate analyst coverage should be increased from the fewer than
three measure to a fewer than five measure.
We test the robustness of the results by separating the sample into firms that
traded on the NYSE and those that did not.  We find that the NYSE sample
firms are more frequently followed by sell-side analysts (probably because they
are larger and more widely owned by institutional investors).  However, the
comparative differences between analyst following in our sample and in the
SEC sample persist.  This shows that the difference between the SEC’s results
and ours is not attributable to a difference in the market where the firms trade.
Finally, in Table 3 we examine the extent of analyst following in relation to
institutional ownership as tabulated by Market Guide.  Institutional ownership
is highly statistically correlated to analyst coverage.  Using our sample, we find
a correlation coefficient of 0.60 between analyst coverage and institutional
ownership.  This makes intuitive sense, as analysts are much more likely to
cover stocks where there are institutional buyers.67
More important for our purposes, it suggests that institutional stock owner-
ship is a second important proxy for market efficiency.  If we are correct, then
our data on institutional stock ownership should also show that a surprisingly
high number of companies that are eligible to file Form B have stocks that are
not widely held by institutions and are not followed by analysts.
For firms using Form A under the SEC’s proposed limits of size and trading
volume, 2802 firms (59.2%)68 have low institutional ownership69 and fewer than
three analysts following the companies.  For Form B firms, 498 (15.9%) have
low institutional ownership and fewer than three analysts following the compa-
nies.  We find it troubling that such a high percentage of companies with low in-
stitutional stock ownership are eligible to file Form B.  We again express our
concern that the SEC’s numerical cutoffs are set too low in the current propos-
als.
Finally, we note that, historically, the SEC has established reporting re-
quirements based on fixed market capitalization (or float) level or a fixed level
of trading volume.  Using these fixed levels ignores the historical appreciation
67. The SEC recognizes this point in Aircraft Carrier, supra note 1, at 59, but it does not examine
levels of institutional ownership.
68. This result is calculated by summing the upper left nine cells in the Form A panel of Table 3
divided by the total Form A firms.
69. We define low institutional stock ownership as less than 30% of the shares outstanding.  Al-
though this number is somewhat arbitrary, it represents an ownership level that is less than the sample
average (see Table 1).  We justify this choice as consistent with a reasonable threshold level below
which sell-side analysts would de-emphasize coverage of the company’s stock.
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of company value as share prices increase over time.  In the current SEC pro-
posal, companies are required to disclose issuing information using Form A
only if their firm size or market transaction activity remains below fixed levels.
We believe that the SEC should consider the adoption of limits that reflect the
growth in firm and market activity value.  For instance, the SEC could require
that the fixed levels are periodically changed as the market capitalization of the
S&P 500 increases.  Such a requirement would ensure that all companies do not
make the transition from Form A to Form B simply because the market capi-
talization of (substantially) all firms increases over time.
TABLE 3
ANALYST FOLLOWING AND INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
FORM A COMPANIES
Institutional Ownership
Number of
analysts
following a
company
0%
to
10%
10%
to
20%
20%
to
30%
30%
to
40%
40%
to
50%
50%
to
60%
60%
to
70%
70%
to
80%
80%
to
90%
90%
to
100%
No Owner-
ship Data
Form
A To-
tal
0 1300 437 251 139 69 56 24 13 15 7 252 2563
1 214 190 134 94 58 36 27 17 1 1 7 779
2 79 104 93 82 46 35 29 19 12 9 4 512
3 33 58 82 55 51 27 28 21 11 4 1 371
4 15 34 41 38 25 23 17 12 8 6 219
5 2 16 24 24 21 17 14 14 7 3 142
5<#<10 2 12 18 25 23 19 10 9 10 12 1 141
10<#<15 1 2 2 5
15<#<20 1 1 2
number
of>20
Form A
Total
1646 851 644 459 293 213 149 107 65 42 265 4734
Source: Market Guide (Dec. 31, 1998).  The following statistical measures were used: aver-
age, median, sum, and percent.
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FORM B COMPANIES
Institutional Ownership
Number of
analysts
following a
company
0%
to
10%
10%
to
20%
20%
to
30%
30%
to
40%
40%
to
50%
50%
to
60%
60%
to
70%
70%
to
80%
80%
to
90%
90%
to
100%
No Owner-
ship Data
Form
B To-
tal
0 247 67 66 39 33 21 18 4 6 7 20 528
1 25 23 14 13 16 9 10 12 4 4 1 131
2 17 26 13 21 17 19 17 17 8 6 4 165
3 11 25 25 20 23 23 21 27 13 6 3 197
4 11 21 30 30 24 26 30 38 15 23 1 249
5 7 21 30 23 22 26 33 28 32 22 1 245
5<number
of<10
17 28 59 81 96 108 133 148 106 121 2 899
10<number
of<15
1 12 15 29 40 57 73 66 84 63 4 444
15<number
of<20
0 1 3 9 11 16 27 42 36 26 0 171
number
of>20
0 1 3 4 11 26 31 13 13 8 2 112
Form B
Total
336 225 258 269 293 331 393 395 317 286 38 3141
Source: Market Guide (Dec. 31, 1998).  The following statistical measures were used: aver-
age, median, sum, and percent.  Table 3 uses the actual SEC measure of size, public float, as
the measure of company size.
V
CONCLUSION
In formulating the federal securities laws that govern the issuance of new
securities by corporations, the SEC needs quantifiable measures to set thresh-
old limitations on the applicability of rules.  This article has addressed the
SEC’s determination of what the appropriate standards should be in its latest
regulatory proposals, the Aircraft Carrier.  As explained above, we believe that
the SEC overstated the efficiency of the markets for many corporate securities
by using an overestimate of the number of securities analysts in its research.  If
it should decide to move forward with these proposals, we urge the SEC to redo
its earlier research with a more defensible methodology.  It should also consider
the use of institutional investor ownership data as an adjunct measure of market
efficiency to confirm the accuracy of its estimates.
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We recognize the inherent difficulty of such line drawing exercises.  Even
the appropriate measure for market efficiency is debatable, for there is little
empirical research on how to best quantify measures of market efficiency.
Nevertheless, the SEC’s stated goal of ensuring that investors receive adequate
information to make informed investment decisions argues against adopting too
low a standard for permitting companies to reduce their disclosures when they
are actively marketing their securities.  We advise that the SEC do as it did with
these thresholds under the integrated disclosure system and err on the side of
caution in establishing the initial requirements for the new Form B.  It is better
for investors if the SEC adjusts the new thresholds later on, rather than setting
them too low at the beginning of the new regime.
